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Abstract: One such wireless technology used to deploy sensitive network services requiring
low rate communication, short distance application with low power consumption is the
IEEE802.15.4 Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPAN). These network
services have stringent security requirements and, irrespective of the scale of deployment,
the network should be secure enough to protect users, infrastructure, network services and
applications. In this paper, we focus on the security mechanisms deﬁned in the standard;
evaluating it in the light of the ITU-T recommendation X.805 security architecture for
end-to-end communication. We identify and assess the security dimensions, planes and layers
in IEEE802.15.4 LR-WPAN as deﬁned in the X.805 framework.
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1 Introduction and background
With the current proliferation of different types of
networks and network technologies, the number of
applications and services that run on these networks keep
increasing exponentially; thus, if not adequately secured,
the network infrastructure, services and applications
become increasingly vulnerable to damaging threats
and attacks. Hackers, viruses, vindictive employees
and even human errors all represent clear dangers to
networks. Moreover, all computer users, from the casual
internet surfer, service providers to government and large
enterprise networks could be affected by network security
breaches; thus underscoring the global dimension of the
network security challenge.
This challenge has inspired some research in the
academia and industry on options for ensuring network
assurance and security, nevertheless, absolute immunity
against network intruders remains elusive. As opined by
Gutmann and Grigg (2005) a 99.9% secure system is
still 0.1% insecure against unknown vulnerabilities which
can easily translate into 100% insecurity from attacks
with the greatest probability of success, since 1 out
of every 1000 attacks can succeed. Statistics show that
network attacks continue to increase at an alarming rate.
For instance, Andrew et al. (2004) showed that over
182,000 threats were reported between 2002 and 1988
while just 6 were reported in 1988, and 82,000 occurring
in 2002 alone. Industry estimates in Maughan (2007)
revealed that the global cost of cyber attacks in 2003 was
US$226 billion. Often times, these reported threats are
exclusive of internal attacks which are rarely reported
and potentially more dangerous than external attacks.
It therefore becomes imperative to design and create
a comprehensive, cross-platform, top-down, end-to-end
perspective security architecture applicable to diverse
networks irrespective of the application.
This end-to-end security need has resulted into
three different frameworks: the Lucent network security
framework, the ISO/IEC 18028 (part 1–5, 2005) and
the ITU-T recommendation X.805 security framework.
The Lucent network security framework was developed
to address robustness of network security for systems
providing end-to-end communications. It was an
updated, precursor to the X.805 security architecture
developed by the ITU-T study group (Reinhard, 2005).
The X.805 was also padded to address end-to-end
network security for wireless voice and data, wireless,
optical and converged networks. It was designed to
address global security challenges of services providers
and enterprise networks across all types of networks
and layers of the protocol stack to evaluate security
vulnerabilities. The International Organization for
Standardization (1994), ISO, also deﬁnes a similar
standard ISO/IEC 18028 (part 1–5, 2005) which
provides detailed guidance on Information Technology
network security techniques, architecture, management,
operations and interconnections.
The IEEE 802.15.4 LR-WPAN speciﬁcation outlines
a new class of wireless radios and protocols targeted at
low power devices, personal area networks, body area
networks and sensor nodes which ﬁnd application in
control systems, security systems, industrial automation,
patient monitoring systems and inventory tracking etc.
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard (2006) also called
(LR-WPAN) deﬁnes the Physical Layer (PHY) and
Medium Access Control (MAC) sub-layer speciﬁcations
for low-data-rate wireless connectivity with ﬁxed,
portable, and moving devices with no battery or very
limited battery consumption requirements. It is foreseen
that, depending on the application, a longer range
at a lower data rate may be an acceptable trade-off.
According to the standard, the main objectives of
an LR-WPAN are ease of installation, reliable data
transfer, short-range operation, extremely low cost, and
a reasonable battery life, while maintaining a simple
and ﬂexible protocol. In addition to the one-hop star
topology, a peer-to-peer topology can as well be used to
satisfy the needs of diverse multi-hop applications.
The speciﬁcation also includes a number of optional
security provisions that can be applied on a per frame
basis. Study in Xiao et al. (2005) shows that security is
not mandatory in the LR-WPAN standard, thus, it runs
the risk of non-implementation since manufacturers or
vendors determine what to include in products.
In this paper, we analyse the application of the X.805
security architecture to the security provisions in the
IEEE 802.15.4 LR-WPAN. In Section 2, using related
examples, we draw attention to the distinctive security
features of X.805 framework: threats, dimensions, layers
and planes. In Section 3, we investigate the robustness of
the LR-WPAN security suites and security modes while
in Section 4, we provide a reﬂection of X.805 on IEEE
802.15.4 LR-WPAN. We also discussed example threats,
performances and vulnerabilities. We conclude the paper
in Section 5 by providing certain remarks on the study.
2 The X.805 security framework
In this section, we describe the threats, the distinct
types of network activities that need to be protected,
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known as the Security Planes, the type of protection
needed against the matching threats, termed as Security
Dimensions and the distinct types of network equipment
and facility groupings that need to be protected, known
as Security Layers. The X.805 framework describes a
security structure aim to address how to identify, correct
and thwart both deliberate and inadvertent threats
emanating remotely or within the network. Five security
threats are identiﬁed: destruction, corruption, removal,
disclosure and interruption (Reinhard, 2005).
2.1 Security threats
Interruption. This occurs when a network asset becomes
lost, unusable, destroyed or unavailable. For instance,
erasure of a software or data ﬁle, sabotage of
communication line and malicious removal of any
network resource. This is an attack on availability.
Corruption. This is an unauthorised tampering with
a network asset. Examples include changing network
conﬁgurations or values in the database, modiﬁcation
of network data trafﬁc, fabrication and insertion of
counterfeit objects etc. This is an attack on integrity and
authenticity.
Destruction. This occurs when an unauthorised entity
gains access to a network and fabricates counterfeit
objects, performs untraceable malicious activities and
network entities becomes unusable or unavailable. This is
also an attack on availability.
Removal. This is when an asset, information or any
form of network resource becomes stolen, deleted, lost or
removed by an unauthorised party. This is an attack on
availability.
Disclosure. Occurs when an unauthorised person,
program or computing systems gains access to
or interrupts a network asset. Examples include
interception, wiretapping to obtain network data and
passive eavesdropping on a wireless radio transmission.
This is an attack on conﬁdentiality.
2.2 Security dimensions
The X.805 deﬁnes eight basic dimensions (or protection
types). Combinations of the dimensions help thwart the
above threats and vulnerabilities. These dimensions have
the capabilities to protect networks, applications, services
and end user information. As shown in Figure 1, the
eight dimensions interface between the network systems
and internal or external threats by providing the required
mitigation. The dimensions are:
Access management or access control protects against
unauthorised use of network resources. Access
management ensures that only authorised personnel
or devices are allowed access to network elements,
stored information, information ﬂows, services, and
applications. In addition, role-based access control
provides different access levels to guarantee that
individuals and devices can only gain access and perform
operations on the network elements, stored information,
and information ﬂows for which they are authorised.
The access management security dimension addresses the
corruption security threats.
Figure 1 Eight security dimensions thwarting attacks and
threats to the network systems (see online version
for colours)
Authentication is used to conﬁrm the identities
of communicating entities. Authentication ensures
the validity of the claimed identities of the entities
participating in communication (e.g., person, device,
service, or application) and provides assurance that
an entity is not attempting a masquerade nor is it
an unauthorised replay of a previous communication.
The authentication security dimension addresses the
corruption security threat.
Non-repudiation provides proof of the origin of data
or the cause of an event or an action. It ensures the
availability of evidence that can be used to prove that
some kind of event or action has taken place so that
the cause of the event or action cannot be repudiated
later. The non-repudiation security dimension addresses
the corruption security threat.
Data conﬁdentiality protects data from unauthorised
disclosure. Data conﬁdentiality ensures that data is kept
private from unauthorised access or viewing. Encryption,
coupled with access management techniques, is often used
to keep data secure. This security dimension addresses the
disclosure and corruption threat.
Communication security ensures that information ﬂows
only between the authorised endpoints. The information
ﬂow is not diverted or intercepted as it ﬂows between
endpoints. The recommendation does discuss a routing
control mechanism that could be used to provide
communication security at the IP layer and above.
This security dimension addresses the interception
threat.
Data integrity ensures the correctness or accuracy
of data against unauthorised modiﬁcation, deletion,
creation, and replication and provides an indication of
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unauthorised activities in these areas. The data integrity
security dimension addresses the corruption security
threats.
Availability ensures that there is no denial of authorised
access to network elements, stored information,
information ﬂows, services, and applications due to
anything affecting the network. Disaster recovery
solutions are included in this category. The security
dimension addresses the interruption, removal and
destruction threats.
Privacy provides for the protection of information that
might be derived from observing network activities.
This dimension also includes protection of information
associated with individual users, service providers,
enterprises, or network infrastructure that might be
obtained either by direct or covert means. The privacy
security dimension addresses the disclosure security
threat.
2.3 Security layers
X.805 Security Framework includes the concept of
security layers that consist of a hierarchy of network
equipment and facility groupings that need to be
protected. These three security layers identify areas where
security must be addressed. They build on one another
to provide comprehensive, end-to-end security solutions
(Andrew et al., 2004).
The infrastructure layer consists of the network
transmission facilities as well as individual network
elements and hardware platforms. The infrastructure
layer also includes the ofﬁces or physical facilities in
which the transmission equipments, network elements,
and platforms reside. The infrastructure layer represents
the fundamental building blocks of networks, their
services, and their applications. Examples of components
that belong to the infrastructure layer are routers,
switches, and servers as well as the communication links
between them.
The services layer consists of services that customers
receive from service providers. These services range from
basic transport and basic IP connectivity (e.g., internet
access), IP service enablers such as Authentication,
Authorisation, and Accounting (AAA) services, dynamic
host conﬁguration services, and domain name services
to value-added services such as Voice over IP (VoIP),
Quality of Service (QoS), Virtual Private Networks
(VPNs), location services, 800-services, and Instant
Messaging (IM). At this layer the end users as well
as the service provider are potential targets of security
threats. For example, an attacker may attempt to
deny the service provider’s ability to offer the service,
or the attacker may attempt to disrupt service for an
individual customer of the service provider (e.g., a large
corporation).
The applications layer focuses on network based
applications accessed by service provider customers,
as well as end-user applications that require network
services. These applications are enabled by network
services and include basic applications such as ﬁle
transport (e.g., File Transfer Protocol (FTP)) and
web-browsing applications, fundamental applications
such as directory assistance (e.g., 411), network-based
voice messaging, and e-mail, as well as high-end
applications such as customer relationship management,
human resource systems, electronic/mobile commerce,
network-based training, and video collaboration.
Network-based applications may be provided by
third-party Application Service Providers (ASPs), service
providers acting as ASPs, or by enterprises hosting
them in their own (or leased) data centres. At this
layer, there are four potential targets for security
attacks: the application user, the application content
provider, the middleware provided by third-party
integrators (e.g., web-hosting services), and the service
provider.
Figure 2 depicts the security layers as a series of
enablers for secure network solutions: the infrastructure
layer enables the services layer, and the services layer
enables the applications layer. In addition, the X.805
framework recognises that each layer has unique security
vulnerabilities, which result in potential security threats
and attacks if they are not addressed.
Figure 2 Hierarchy of security layers providing complete
end-to-end security against threats and attacks.
The dimensions are applied to each layer to prevent
network vulnerabilities to attacks (see online version
for colours)
2.4 Security planes
The security planes represent the three types of activities
that take place on a network. By deﬁning these planes,
the management plane, the control plane, and the
end-user plane, we can focus on the unique security
needs associated with network management activities,
control or signalling activities, and end-user activities.
Figure 3 shows the interworking of the planes, layers and
dimensions. Each layer of each of the planes requires
different security measures. The diagram shows how
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Figure 3 Different planes representing the types of activities on the network and hierarchy of security layers providing complete
end-to-end security against threats and attacks (see online version for colours)
end-to-end security can be provided to address threats by
using the dimensions.
The management plane facilitates the Operations,
Administration, Maintenance, and Provisioning
(OAM&P) of the network elements, transmission
facilities, back-ofﬁce systems (e.g., operations support
systems, business support systems, customer care
systems), and data centres. This plane supports the Fault,
Conﬁguration, Accounting, Performance, and Security
(FCAPS) functions. It should be noted that the network
carrying the trafﬁc for these activities may be in-band or
out-of-band with respect to the service provider’s user
trafﬁc.
The control plane is concerned with enabling the efﬁcient
delivery of information, services, and applications
across the network. It typically involves machine-to-
machine communications of information that allows the
machines (e.g., switches or routers) to determine how
to best route or switch trafﬁc across the underlying
transport network. This type of information is sometimes
referred to as control or signalling information. The
network carrying these types of messages may be
in-band or out-of-band with respect to the service
provider’s user trafﬁc. For example, IP networks carry
their control information in-band, whereas the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) carries its control
information in a separate out-of-band signalling network
(the Signalling System 7 (SS7) network). Example trafﬁc
of this type includes routing protocols (e.g., OSPF, BGP,
DNS, and SS7).
The end-user plane addresses how service provider
customers access and use the service provider’s network.
This plane also represents actual end-user data ﬂows.
End users may use the service provider’s network to
provide connectivity, beneﬁt from value-added services
such as VPNs, or to access network-based applications.
Service provider networks should be designed such that
events on one security plane are kept totally isolated
from the other security planes. For example, a ﬂood of
DNS lookups, originating from activity on the end-user
plane, should not lock out the OAM&P interface in
the management plane, preventing an administrator from
correcting the problem.
3 IEEE LR-WPAN security standard
The IEEE 802.15.4 (LR-WPAN) deﬁnes the PHY and the
MAC sub-layer speciﬁcations for low data rate wireless
connectivity. LR-WPAN has same vulnerabilities as
other wireless technologies, e.g., passive eavesdropping,
active tampering etc. Hence, security issues must be
addressed to facilitate effective communication across
the network (Zheng et al., 2006). However, in LR-
WPAN, most security problems are addressed at the
higher layer. The security offered on the PHY and MAC
layer provides four (4) security dimensions or protection
types (Xiao et al., 2005).
Access control: It provides Access Control List (ACL)
of valid devices from which the device can receive frames.
This mechanism prevents the unauthorised devices from
communicating on the network.
Data encryption: It protects messages from an
unauthorised access by using encryption algorithms.
Only the devices that share the secret key can decrypt the
messages and communicate.
Frame integrity: The objective is to prevent changes from
being made by an invalid intruder and to provide an
assurance that the messages from the source device have
not been manipulated by the intruder.
Sequential freshness: The objective is to prevent replayed
message from being accepted by the receiver and to
ensure that the frame that has arrived is the recent one
and not a replay. This is achieved by ensuring that a
receiver checks (i.e., authenticates) the recent counter and
rejects the frame which has the counter value equal to or
less than the previously obtained counter values.
3.1 Security modes
Three security modes are deﬁned in the speciﬁcation
to achieve different security objectives: NULL mode,
ACL mode and secured mode. An ACL list includes
multiple ACL entries. From Table 1, each ACL entry
includes an address ﬁeld composed of the source and the
destination addresses. The last Initial Vector (IV) and
the replay counter are the same except that the last IV
is used by the source device when it sends the packet,
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and the replay counter is a scheme used by the destination
device to prevent replay attack. The key is a symmetric
key shared between the devices. The three modes are
discussed below.
Table 1 ACL entry format
Security control Frame counter Key identiﬁer
NULL mode: This mode is for those low cost applications
that do not require any security at all. In other words,
no security service is provided. A NULL is speciﬁed.
ACL mode: Since each device maintains its ACL, this
mode allows the receiving of the frames from only those
devices that are present in the device’s ACL. Limited
security services for communications are provided in this
mode. If a frame does not come from a device listed in the
ACL, the frame will be rejected. However, cryptographic
protection is not provided in this mode. Most ﬁelds in the
ACL such as security suite, key, last Initial Vector (IV),
and replay counter, are not needed in this mode.
Secured mode: The secured mode provides all the security
services according to the deﬁned security suite. It provides
the conﬁdentiality of the frame along with message
integrity, access control, and sequential freshness. It uses
all the ﬁelds in the ACL entry format in Table 2. The
secured mode is implemented by the security suite listed
in the ACL entry, and explained in the next subsection.
Table 2 Frame control header
Address (Source Security Key Last IV Replay
& Destination) suite counter
3.2 Security suite
Several security suites are deﬁned in IEEE 802.15.4.
Security suites include security mechanisms deﬁned
for MAC frames which include symmetric encryption
algorithm, mode, and integrity code bit length. If the
security mode is enabled, the security suite is used and the
MAC checks the ACL entry for the suite and provides
the security services accordingly.
Table 3 shows the entire possible security suites.
The security levels are ordered according to the
protection level offered. The security suites gradually
provide stronger security as the level goes down the table
in terms of encryption, integrity, sequential freshness
(SEQ) and access control. Since ACL is maintained by
each device, when a secure communication is speciﬁed,
the ACL would be checked before access is granted to the
device requesting access. Furthermore, the IEEE 802.15.4
(2006) standard also speciﬁed that whenever non-trivial
protection is required, replay protection (also called
sequential freshness or authentication) is also provided.
Thus, when MIC-X is ON for integrity, SEQ is also
ON for sequential freshness as shown above. The ﬁrst
level ‘None’ implements none of the protection schemes;
hence it is used in the unsecured mode. This is usually
obtained when a NULL value is set in the bit of the
frame control header as shown in Table 3. The next
three levels: MIC-32, MIC-64 and MIC-128 provide the
same frame authentication functionality but with an
increasing level of hash output or bit length of Message
Integrity Code (MIC). MIC is basically a scheme to
conﬁrm the genuineness of a received message. The MIC
is a hash of the arbitrary-length authenticated data with
a block cipher. The output can then be encrypted and
transmitted over the network provided encryption, ENC,
is speciﬁed in the security requirement. A receiver then
re-computes the hash and by comparing its computation
with the received signal, the receiver can determine if a
signal has been altered or not. The longer the bit length,
the higher the strength of the authenticity and integrity
provided.
These upper 3 MIC modes do not provide encryption
of data frame. Level 5, ENC, provides no authentication
but provides encryption which is a conﬁdentiality
dimension. Meanwhile, ENC-MIC-32, ENC-MIC-64 and
ENC-MIC-128 provide encryption in addition to the
functions of the higher suites. That is, they encrypt the
output of the MIC-X before transmitting to the receiver.
They are used in secure mode. As shown in Sastry and
Wagner (2004), the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) algorithm is used in this speciﬁcation and is
deﬁned in Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) for use by US Government organisations to
Table 3 Possible security modes in LR-WPAN
Table 3: Security services
Security Access Control Data conﬁdentiality Frame integrity Sequential freshness, SEQ,
suite name (ACL) (Encryption) (integrity) (Authentication)
None – – – –
MIC-32 × – × ×
MIC-64 × – × ×
MIC-128 × – × ×
ENC × × – –
ENC-MIC-32 × × × ×
ENC-MIC-64 × × × ×
ENC-MIC-128 × × × ×
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protect sensitive and unclassiﬁed information. The
AES has features such as better security, performance,
efﬁciency, ease of implementation and ﬂexibility.
It speciﬁes three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits. The
IEEE 802.15.4 standard adopts the 128 bit block size and
key length.
4 Assessing LR-WPAN using X.805 framework
In this subsection, we provide assessment of the
LR-WPAN security suites and pointed out the threats
observed when considered in the light of X.805
framework. It should be noted that X.805 security layers
represent a separate category that is orthogonal to
the layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
reference model (ISOIEC, 2006); all three security layers
can be applied to each layer of the OSI reference model.
However, in this work, we focus on the PHY and MAC
layer deﬁned in the LR-WPAN standard.
4.1 Security planes in IEEE802.15.4 LR-WPAN
We view the three security planes in terms of basic
activities on the network and we map the three security
modes speciﬁed in the standard into the three planes
depending on the functions performed by the plane and
the mode. The ENC provides encryption while the MIC
provides authentication and integrity. The ENC-MIC-X
(where X represents the length of the authentication
tag) combines the functions of ENC and MIC. The
requested security can be NULL or speciﬁed as any one
of the security modes. LR-WPAN provides controlled
security by specifying a minimum security level entry.
This entry speciﬁes information regarding the security
level expected from both sender and receiver of data
frames. The Security Enabled Subﬁeld ﬂag is set to zero
if NULL security is required. Clearly, processing of an
incoming frame will fail if the frame is not adequately
protected by the sender.
4.1.1 Management plane in LR-WPAN
We view this in terms of how the administration,
conﬁguration, self-maintenance, security and
performance of the elements/nodes affect the network
performance and security. Usually, we expect vendors/
manufacturers to implement this plane. The activities
on this plane can also be viewed as administrator-
device/network elements relationship. This plane is
expected to provide authentication function. It should
conﬁrm the identities of the entities requesting the
service of the network elements and ensure that identity
of the requesting party is who it claims to be. Other
securities expected on this plane include access control
and resources availability. Meanwhile, we can infer that
the security speciﬁcation of LR-WPAN provides both
authentication and access control while availability is not
guaranteed. For instance, access control is provided by
using an ACL which speciﬁes a list of valid devices that
can request services of the network elements. However,
availability of the element is not guaranteed for any
entity requesting access. Hence, interruption, removal or
destruction remains possibilities.
4.1.2 Control and signalling plane in LR-WPAN
The control and signalling plane can be viewed in
terms of device-to-device communication on the network.
Since data frame or packet transfer must be efﬁciently
delivered across the network, security must be provided
on this plane. The vendor or manufacturer is also
expected to implement this function though it is
optional. Moreover, since data traverses the network
when devices communicate, the security expected on
the control and signalling plane includes communication
security, data conﬁdentiality, data integrity and privacy.
Communication security is important because the
standard deﬁnes peer-to-peer topology which allows
more complex network formations to be implemented,
such as mesh networking topology. Other peer-to-peer
network functions mentioned but not deﬁned are ad hoc,
self-organising, and self-healing functions. It may also
allow multiple hops to route messages from any device to
any other device on the network.
Considering the LR-WPAN speciﬁcations, it
is apparent that communication security was not
implemented while conﬁdentiality, integrity and privacy
are provided by using encryption and MIC. Hence,
we can conclude that IEEE802.15.4 provides mitigation
against disclosure and corruption but data is still
vulnerable to interception. ACK attack (Xiao et al., 2005)
is an example of such threat. For instance, there is no
integrity protection provided on ACK frames. When a
sender sends a frame, it can request an ACK frame from
the receiver by setting the bit ﬂags in the outgoing data
frame. The eavesdropper can forge the ACK frame by
using the un-encrypted sequence number from the data
frame. If an adversary does not want a particular frame
to be received by the receiver, it can send interference to
the receiver at the same time when the sender is sending
the data frame. This leads to rejection of the frame.
The adversary can then send a forged ACK frame fooling
the sender that the receiver successfully received the
frame. Therefore, a sender cannot be sure if the received
frame is come from the receiver or another node even if
the receiver received the ACK frame.
4.1.3 End-user plane in LR-WPAN
In IEEE802.15.4, end-user plane speciﬁes how
network elements access and use resources from
one another. It also deﬁnes user data ﬂow across
communication channels connecting devices. Activities
on this plane include access or connectivity veriﬁcation
and authentication. Security requirement thus include
access control, authentication, conﬁdentiality, integrity,
communication security, privacy and availability.
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All these are needed since it involves end-to-end
communication. The LR-WPAN speciﬁcation provides
many of the afore-mentioned security requirements by
using authentication and encryption of the AES which
provides both access control and encryption. However,
the speciﬁcation did not include a security scheme for
non-repudiation and communication security. These are
possibly left for higher layer implementation.
4.2 Security layers in IEEE802.15.4 LR-WPAN
This subsection highlights the security layer of the
LR-WPAN as deﬁned in the X.805 security framework.
4.2.1 Infrastructure layer in LR-WPAN
This layer is expected to facilitate security for
hardware and all physical components involved in data
transmission. If the infrastructures are not adequately
secured, data transmission could be compromised and
vulnerable to attacks. The attacks might take a subtle
form and lead to unavailability of network elements.
Moreover, the standard uses the widely available
spectrum band which makes the infrastructure vulnerable
to various kinds of interruptions, corruptions and
alteration of conﬁguration or ACL proﬁle. Expected
securities on this layer include network element
availability to protect the elements against removal,
destruction or interruption. No infrastructure layer
security such as user or device authentication and key
management schemes are implemented in the standard
only authentication, access control and integrity which
are not related to infrastructure layer security are
implemented.
4.2.2 Service layer security in LR-WPAN
Attacks on the service layer are usually in the form
of denial-of-service, masquerading or replay; thus,
services here should be protected against unauthorised
modiﬁcation, corruption or fabrication of the ACL,
disclosure and interception. Service security layer
includes maintaining an ACL and using the 3 AES modes
to protect fraudulent transmissions. Since all security
services deﬁned in the standard are optional, it means
that security on this layer too is not guaranteed. Hence,
Table 4 Summary of security scheme provided at the planes and layers of the LR-WPAN
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integrity, availability, conﬁdentiality and access control
must be provided. However, in LRWPAN, availability is
not guaranteed and integrity can also be compromised
under certain conditions. A possible attack on this layer
is called replay-protection attack (Xiao et al., 2005)
which exploits the sequential freshness scheme of the
LR-WPAN. A malicious, masquerading adversary may
transmit many frames containing different large frame
counter to a receiver who performs sequential freshness
and raises the counter ﬂag as the largest frame counter.
However, when a legitimate node transmits a frame with
a reasonable frame size deﬁnitely smaller than the replay
counter maintained at the receiver, the frames will be
discarded for replay protection purpose. Hence, a denial
of service occurs.
4.2.3 Application layer security in LR-WPAN
The application layer security is expected to provide
secure communication for end-users’ software and
applications running on the network, e.g., Patient
Monitoring Application (PME), industrial automation,
etc. Hence, it provides security against higher layer
attacks such as spooﬁng, phishing, routing protocol,
software or web server ﬂaws etc. This attack may
lead to loss of lives if launched on a PME since it
may give way to patient data modiﬁcation, false alarm
and suppressed alarm. However, since security is only
speciﬁed for the PHY and MAC layer in IEEE802.15.4,
hence, application layer security is not deﬁned in the
speciﬁcation and different applications, vendors and
devices manufacturers are expected to implement own
application layer security.
A summary of security requirements for
IEEE802.15.4 is provided in Table 4 as well as threat
and dimensions to thwart them. As can be observed, a
few of the dimensions are not addressed in the LR-PAN
standard; hence, they constitute potential loopholes for
attackers to intrude into the network.
5 Conclusion
Network security is inevitably a major concern
considering the alarming growth rate of network
attacks. A secure network should protect against
malicious and inadvertent attack while also providing
high reliability, availability and integrity. Irrespective
of the scale of deployment, a secure network should
protect users, infrastructure, network services and
applications. Examples of such sensitive services include
manufacturing automated systems, security systems,
health care monitoring systems, sensor surveillance
systems etc. These network services require different
security requirements which become the determining
factor of the efﬁciency of the system. One such
wireless technology used to deploy these services is the
IEEE802.15.4 LR-WPAN for short distance application
with low power consumption. In this paper, we focused
on understudying the security mechanisms deﬁned in
the speciﬁcation and we evaluated it in the light of
the ITU-T recommendation X.805 security architecture
for end-to-end communication. We also identiﬁed the
security dimensions, planes and layers in IEEE802.15.4
LR-WPAN as deﬁned in the X.805.
Our ﬁndings shows that despite the fact that the
LR-WPAN deﬁned a variety of relatively strong but
optional security schemes, it is not robust enough to
provide secure end-to-end communication, even if the
application is built directly on the MAC layer. This
becomes apparent when we classify the LR-WPAN into
different perspectives of layers and planes. Some of
the perspectives fail to provide the required protection
types (dimensions) such as communication security,
availability, non-repudiation and privacy. Consequently,
certain parts of the standard are vulnerable to threats
like data corruption, disclosure, interception, fabrication
and removal especially when we consider the security
features being deﬁned as optional. Moreover, the
standard omits security schemes like key management
and device authentication leaving them for higher layer
implementation.
As future work, we hope to explore a reﬂection
of X.805 security architecture that is fast become
a worldwide security standard, on the IEEE802.15.X
family.
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